

Kent Helicopter
Ambulance
Service
final report on
assessment study



**Foundation for Road
Safety Research**

Kent Helicopter Ambulance Service final report on assessment study

Presented to the AA Foundation for Road Safety Research
by
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The AA Foundation for Road Safety Research

The AA Foundation was formed by the Automobile Association in December 1986 as part of its continuing efforts in the road safety field and as a major contribution to European Road Safety Year.

Registered as a charity, the objectives of the Foundation are:

To carry out, or procure, research into all factors affecting the safe use of public roads;

To promote and encourage the safe use of public roads by all classes of users through the circulation of advice, information and knowledge gained from research; and

To conceive, develop and implement programmes and courses of action designed to improve road safety, these to include the carrying out of projects or programmes intended to educate young children or others in the safe use of public roads.

Control of the AA Foundation is vested in a Council of Management under the Chairmanship of Sir Peter Baldwin.

Support for the Foundation in its sponsorship of research projects is encouraged from companies and other bodies that have a concern for and interest in road safety. During the time the research reported here was undertaken, the Foundation was supported by:

The Caravan Club, Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte, Europcar (UK), ICL, The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, and insurance companies Bishopsgate, City of Westminster, Commercial Union, Cornhill, Eagle Star, GRE, London & Edinburgh, Minster, Municipal Mutual, NEM, Norwich Union, Orion, Provincial, Rose Thomson Young Underwriting, Royal, Sphere Drake and Sun Alliance.

1 Introduction and study methodology

This is the final report prepared under a contract between the AA Foundation for Road Safety Research and Margaret Heraty ("the Consultant").

The terms of reference for the study were:

- 1 to examine the records of the use of the helicopter ambulance in Kent and to assess the value of the service so rendered by reference to its use and in comparison with the level of service of the Kent Ambulance Service without its assistance;
- 2 to draw such inferences as can reasonably be deduced from (1) concerning the possibility of minimising the consequences of accidents particularly on the roads; and
- 3 to report to the AA Foundation on the findings.

The study covered the three-month operational period 16 March to 18 June 1990, beginning just after the resolution of the ambulance service dispute.

The primary data source was the set of flight records kept by the Kent Ambulance Service (KAS) paramedic personnel, two of whom are carried on the helicopter; these records were provided by KAS Headquarters' staff who also analysed them for their own monitoring purposes. For each flight on which a patient was conveyed to hospital from an accident or emergency, a standard form AMB46 (as used on land ambulances) was also completed with details of the patient's condition and any treatment given. A sample of each form is shown in Appendix A. These forms had been in use since the helicopter started operation in December 1989.

Each AMB46 was inspected by Mr Jim Walker, Accident and Emergency Consultant at Kent and Sussex Hospital, Tunbridge Wells. Those cases in which the use of the helicopter appeared to be "justified", in terms of potential saving of life or reduction in recovery time or long-term disability, were identified and Mr Walker – albeit with some difficulty – obtained follow-up information from the large number of different medical consultants (both inside and outside the county) who had subsequently treated the relevant patients. A broad assessment (although in qualitative rather than quantitative terms) was then generally possible of the value of using the helicopter as distinct from conveying the patient by land ambulance.

There was one flaw in this approach to the assessment of benefits which was not evident at the time of designing the study around the pre-existing record keeping system, but which has led to an under-estimation of the benefits from the helicopter operation. It emerged during the study that there appears to be a significant number of cases in which the paramedics on board the helicopter treat a patient (often an accident victim) at the site of the incident until he or she is stabilised,

but the patient is then carried by land ambulance to hospital. No record of these events is kept by the helicopter crew (as distinct from the bare record of their attendance at the incident and details of the flights to and from the site) and their frequency has had to be estimated from inspection of the length of time the helicopter was at the site: the assumption being made that if it were there for more than a few minutes, some medical help had been provided by its crew.

Control Commanders at KAS Headquarters at Linton Hospital, Coxheath (near Maidstone) provided not only explanations of how the emergency ambulance service works and how the helicopter is activated but also their views on when it should be sent to an incident. Mr Martin Read and his colleagues in the KAS Training School on the same site provided the data records and also their own analyses, interpretations and comments. KAS Control staff added to these their estimates of the land ambulance time saved in each case when the helicopter was used to convey a patient. Estimates of land ambulance costs were provided variously by KAS and the Medway District Health Authority (which administers the Ambulance Service for the whole of Kent, on behalf of all six District Health Authorities).

South East Thames Regional Health Authority's (SETRHA) Helicopter Steering Committee invited the Consultant to several of its meetings, when further background information was gleaned from the perspectives of the Health Authority and the Ambulance Service.

During the course of the study, the Consultant had the opportunity to observe the helicopter operation first hand and flew with the aircraft to a number of road accidents. Lengthy discussions were also held with the pilot and with a number of the core team of paramedics from which the flying pair are drawn each week.

Technical and operational aspects were discussed with Mr Jim Webb of the College of Aeronautics at the Cranfield Institute of Technology (a specialist in helicopter design and operation) and Mr David Lewis of McAlpine Helicopters at Hayes, who was able to provide actual and hypothetic costs for alternative operating patterns, as well as further insights into the present operation and the feasibility of alternative schemes.

Contact was made with specialists in the valuation of life and injury at the Transport and Road Research Laboratory (Dr Goff Jacobs), the University of Newcastle upon Tyne (Professor Mike Jones-Lee), the Medical School at Aberdeen University (Professor Gavin Mooney) and the Department of Transport (Phil Martin and Kate McMahon).

Comparative information was obtained from discussions with Mr Laurie Caple, Chief Ambulance Officer of the Northumbria Ambulance Service NHS Trust, whose own helicopter ambulance was launched at about the beginning of the study.

The consultant would like to acknowledge the enormous help and collaboration provided by all the people and organisations mentioned above, without whom the study could not have been carried out.

2 The helicopter operation

2.1 Service provision and funding

The service is operated by an Aérospatiale Twin Squirrel helicopter, based at Rochester Airport in the Medway towns. Internal fitting was carried out with advice from KAS and enables the pilot and one stretcher case to be carried in the front, with two paramedics in the rear, one of whom has direct access to the patient. The aircraft and pilot are provided by McAlpine Helicopters (the British agents for Aérospatiale helicopters) under a contract to SETRHA.

In addition to the contract with McAlpine, which covers standing charges, maintenance, provision for overhauls and insurance, as well as the pilot (charged virtually at cost), SETRHA has to bear the cost of refuelling the helicopter (generally done at Rochester) and of liquid oxygen replenishment. (The oxygen system has since been changed.) Landing fees and standing charges at Rochester Airport have been waived by the aerodrome owner.

The contract is for a three year-period, with break points at various times throughout. Some subsidy is being provided by McAlpine in that the contract calls for payment for the costs of only four of the first six months' operation and for only 29 of the ensuing 30 months. SETRHA hoped to cover the costs by corporate and public fund-raising; after an initially disappointing start, a public lottery and other fund-raising activities were covering the costs of the month-to-month operation by the end of the study. Corporate sponsorship has, on the other hand, still largely failed to materialise.

Details of the current costs and those of possible alternative patterns of operation are given in Section 3.

2.2 Choice of helicopter

The Aérospatiale Twin Squirrel has many advantages for the present operation. It is economical, operates on any terrain with its skids, and is small and manoeuvrable. Its major disadvantages are that it can only take one patient and, because of its construction and layout, was equipped until recently with a liquid oxygen system which requires constant replenishment. This problem now appears to have been overcome.

It should be said that the restriction to one patient proved a problem on only two occasions during the monitoring period, although there have been further occasions when a doctor or parent has wanted to accompany the patient and could only do so if one of the paramedical staff were left behind. The liquid oxygen refills were more of an inconvenience than a great cost, at 5-10 minutes flying time.

Different aircraft are used in other places. Obviously, larger machines are more expensive in operation and this has to be a guiding factor: thus the MBB (Bolkow) 105, as used in Cornwall and the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, which can take two stretchers, presents levels of expenditure above that of the Twin Squirrel, while offering inferior

standards of patient accessibility and crew comfort in flight and more limited storage capability for emergency medical supplies. The MBB 117 is larger and more expensive still but overcomes some of the practical problems of the 105; its weight does, however, restrict its use on rooftop helipads.

The larger (and more expensive) Aérospatiale Dauphin, used by the London HEMS service, appears to be readily available only with a (retractable) wheeled undercarriage; for use in Kent, skids are greatly to be preferred because of the frequency of landing on unpaved terrain. The Dauphin also has a larger rotor arc than the Squirrel, which restricts its manoeuvrability in restricted areas (*vide*, the occasion when HEMS landed in the Fulham Palace Road and struck a traffic light on take-off, removing a rotor arm cap).

The Aérospatiale Gazelle is smaller than the Squirrel and is not a reasonable proposition for the carriage of patients on stretchers.

The only remaining common types of helicopter, which present reasonable opportunities for good spares and maintenance provision, are found in the Bell range but this offers little other than the single-engined Jet Ranger, which would not be permitted to fly over built-up areas, and the larger and more expensive 212, which has the same disadvantages as the MBB 117 and also a reputation (justified or not) with some police forces for having a poor record of reliability.

It does appear, therefore, that the Twin Squirrel presents a reasonably "good buy" for KAS. Its remaining drawback is the lack of length and height for carrying patients in traction (e.g. spinal injuries), but none of the slightly larger helicopters offers both internal length and height, and the significantly larger ones are so much more expensive that it is not considered that they would be a realistic proposition in the current funding situation.

It is reported that the Northumbria Ambulance Service NHS Trust's Twin Squirrel, which has a somewhat different internal layout from the one used in Kent, appears to be more roomy. In any future adaptation, it would be worth McAlpine and their customer taking some time to consider alternative layouts and reach some optimised design, which might then be able to be produced as an "industry standard" (possibly at reduced cost).

2.3 The nature of the service

The aircraft operates from Thursday to Monday inclusive with a basic eight-hour day, although the paramedic crews may extend on "overtime" within the constraints of the regulations limiting the pilot's hours to 10 per day, or the length of daylight in winter months.

When not in use, the pilot and paramedics are located at Rochester (unless the helicopter has been temporarily relocated for fund-raising purposes, for example to be on show at some local event: in these cases it remains on call). They are called out by telephone or radio by the KAS Control Centre at Linton Hospital. Emergencies ("Primary Incidents") attract an instant response from where the helicopter is based (or in flight if it is returning from another incident); pre-booked flights, for

example urgent inter-hospital transfers ("Secondary Incidents"), may be arranged as far ahead as one or two days before.

The decision to use the helicopter can only be taken by the KAS Control Commander on duty at the time, using the information which he has; this often comes from a member of the public via a 999 call. He also decides whether or not to send a land ambulance as well. Police and Fire Brigade officers on the site of accidents or emergencies may request the helicopter if they have identified a need in their own minds but they cannot require that it be sent.

On occasion a land ambulance without a paramedic may reach an incident and its crew then request that an ambulance with a paramedic be sent; in that case the helicopter may be sent as the second, paramedic-carrying, ambulance. The incidence of such events should diminish, however, as more KAS crews receive paramedic or extended training.

There has been a learning process for the Control Commanders and there does still appear to be some perceptible variation at the margin between different individuals (a year after the beginning of the operation) in terms of the circumstances in which the helicopter is selected to be dispatched. On some occasions the helicopter crew has volunteered its services, on hearing an incident reported on the radio, although it had not been formally called out.

The decision on whether to send it is based on a combination of the nature of the incident and its location (in terms of both the ease of landing the helicopter and remoteness from land ambulance access). The more difficult the location for the helicopter to land, the more it would only be used for very serious cases; conversely it can be used for much less serious cases if the location is appropriate.

In general the helicopter is sent to emergencies where a life threatening condition is reported (for example, suspected heart attacks and other sudden collapses, or where the patient is unconscious from, for example, a diabetic coma or attempted suicide) and to accidents potentially involving serious injury, where these are accessible by air and especially when the location is far from a land ambulance station and/or a road. Road accidents on rural roads including (and, perhaps, especially) motorways, falls from horses in rural areas (with the high risk of head injury) and farm accidents are commonly attended. Because of their location (often far from a motorable road) and the ease of landing the helicopter, less serious accidents on playing fields and farms are sometimes attended even when the level of injury is known to be slight. Similarly several cases of sudden illness on the roadside or on clifftops have been attended.

The geography of the Isle of Grain and the Isle of Sheppey makes these attractive locations for the carriage of a patient by helicopter, as with the remoter areas of Romney Marsh. Patients in these cases may be carried in the interest of convenience (to the patient and the ambulance service) even if time is not critical in terms of treatment.

There is an extensive network of motorways in Kent, including the nine-

mile length of M26 with no slip roads, which can lead to an ambulance having to run 18 miles on the motorway to reach an accident and return. The length of motorways makes helicopter use at the scene of road accidents possibly more common and more effective (c.f. land ambulance access) in the county than it would be elsewhere.

Furthermore, the helicopter pilot has now demonstrated that the aircraft can be set down in many urban or other restricted settings to which it would not initially have been directed. The Police and Fire Brigade are also becoming more expert at finding and clearing landing sites. Thus the locational aspect has become a rather less significant criterion as the period of operation has progressed.

Landing sites have been identified at or near all the major receiving hospitals (in Kent and adjacent counties), some of which have installed paved paths to the designated adjacent grassy area, to facilitate the movement of stretcher trollies. In addition to the standard published guide to hospital landing sites throughout the UK, the pilot has collated, and keeps up to date, more detailed records of these sites with aerial photographs on which hazards (for example, wires) are clearly marked; these enable temporary replacement pilots to operate safely and efficiently.

2.4 Operating parameters in the first year of service

As an overview, the following statistics, which were prepared by Mr Martin Read, are of interest. They cover the first 51 effective weeks of operation from 21 December 1989 to 10 December 1990.

During the 51-week period, 2,040 hours of availability had been planned (based on a standard eight-hour day for the ambulance crews) but some extra hours were operated on paramedic overtime and some extra days were operated by the pilot, so that even with downtime for repairs, planned/unplanned maintenance, etc., a total of 2,078 hours were available for operation. Interestingly, only 2¼ hours were lost due to bad weather in the 51 weeks.

Flights totalled 963: 656 Primary Incidents, 175 Secondaries or transfers (of which four were cancelled on arrival, thus only 171 patients were conveyed by the helicopter) and 132 "Tertiaries": liquid oxygen refills, promotional flights and the like.

Flying times on those Primary Incidents where patients were then carried to hospital included averages of:

- 1.5 minutes mobilisation (from call to take-off)
- 7.6 minutes flying to the scene
- 5.3 minutes flying to the hospital.

Secondary Incidents (transfers) are estimated to have taken an average flying time of 19 minutes between hospitals.

Of the 656 calls to Primary Incidents:

- 86 were cancelled en route by Ambulance Control
- 257 were incidents where the helicopter attended but no patient was conveyed to hospital, although in some of these cases the paramedic team may have treated one or more patients at the scene
- 313 patients were carried to hospital

Of the 313 patients carried from Primary Incidents:

- 53 were infused (drips)
- 2 were intubated (tubes)
- 5 received artificial ventilation (oxygen masks)
- 4 received drugs
- 2 were defibrillated.

There is no comparative data on the average or typical levels of incidence of extended paramedic skills being used by land ambulance crews but the above figures are thought by KAS probably to be higher.

The landing sites used were recorded for 464 of the Primary Incidents as shown in Table 2.1. Fields and grassy areas are clearly the most common (66 per cent), with roads (ranging from suburban housing estates to major trunk routes) at 16 per cent and motorways at six per cent making up the vast majority.

Table 2.1 – Landing sites used for primary incidents

Fields/grassy areas	307	Cliffs	3
Roads	74	Gardens	2
Motorway	28	Golf courses	2
Car parks	14	Railway lines	2
Building sites	11	Tennis courts	2
Beaches	7	Paddock	1
Wooded areas	5	Parade ground	1
Docks	4	Playground	1

The nature of 311 of the 313 Primary Incidents from which patients were conveyed to hospital was recorded as shown in Table 2.2. Road traffic accidents (RTAs) formed the single biggest group, at 118 (38 per cent), followed by sports injuries at 64 (21 per cent). Collapses, falls and works injuries/accidents are the largest other specified types of incident (between five and eight per cent each).

Table 2.2 – Nature of the incident from which patients were conveyed

Accident (unspec.)	16	“Other”	10
Burns	3	Overdose	4
Collapse	26	Railway incident	1
Convulsions (child)	2	Respiratory problem	1
Crush	1	RTA	118
Doctor’s call	1	Sports	64
Epileptic fit	2	Sudden illness (not otherwise specified)	6
Fall	21	Works accident/injury	17
Fight	1	Suicide attempt	2
Injury (unspec.)	15		

Table 2.3 summarises the nature of the patient's expressed "complaint" and/or the paramedics' diagnoses for a sample of the 570 Primary Incidents which the helicopter attended and where the paramedics became involved. (Although this sample totals 311, it is not exactly the same sample as that of patients conveyed which is shown in Table 2.2 due to data deficiencies which are understandable given the nature of the paramedics' primary tasks.) It should be stressed that these did not always accord with the eventual medical diagnosis in hospital, but illustrates the bases on which the paramedics treated the patients and/or on which the decisions were made to convey the patients by helicopter or land ambulance. The predominant broad categories were fractures (totalling 77 or 25 per cent), head injuries (with or without other injuries) (totalling 52 or 17 per cent) and back injuries (30 or 10 per cent).

Table 2.3 – Complaints of patients conveyed to hospital

"Felt faint"	1	Dead on arrival	13
"Felt unwell"	1	Dislocated limb	6
Fractures:		Dog bite	1
Ankle	20	Elbow injury	2
Arm	10	Epileptic fit	5
Femur	12	Epistaxis (nosebleed)	1
Foot	2	Facial injury	3
Hand	1	Gangrenous leg	1
Jaw	1	Head injury + other injury	23
Knee	1	Head injury alone	29
Lower leg	18	Internal bleeding	1
Ribs	5	Knee injury	5
Skull	1	Lacerations	7
Spine (paralysed)	1	Leg injury	5
Wrist	5	Minor injuries	4
Abdominal injury	2	Multiple injuries (severe)	10
Abrasions	1	Overdose	2
Anaphylactic shock (allergy)	1	Rectal bleeding	1
Back injury	30	Respiratory difficulties	2
Blocked shunt	1	Shock	4
Boil	1	Shoulder injury	4
Burns	2	Unstable traction device	1
Chest injury	8	Whiplash	15
Chest pain	11	Others	18
Collapsed/unconscious	10		

The final table in this annual overview, Table 2.4, shows the destination of all 171 Secondary flights which were made carrying patients transferring from one hospital (in Kent) to another. This is usually done to obtain treatment at a regional or national specialised centre (for example, Stoke Mandeville for spinal injuries) or a London teaching hospital, usually still within SETRHA; sometimes the referral and transfer occur almost immediately after the patient has arrived at the first hospital as an emergency, shortly after they have been examined, while on other occasions the patient may have been in hospital for some time before being transferred. In rarer cases, the helicopter was used for expediency for long distance transfers purely to enable a patient to be nearer his/her home and family; this practice has, however, now virtually stopped.

The single most common destination is the Brook Hospital in south-east London which provides Computerised Axial Tomography (CAT) scan facilities for Kent. East Grinstead, the second most common destination, has a plastic surgery and burns unit. In a few cases the helicopter seems to have been used for a local transfer within Kent for reasons which are not entirely clear (these are not believed to be records of return journeys which, if undertaken at all, are either made as part of the same flight – a “wait and return” – or carried by land ambulance).

Table 2.4 – Destination hospitals of transfers made by helicopter

Greater London:		Kent:	
Atkinson Morley	6	Hurst Wood Park	1
Brook	60	Kent Ophthalmic	1
Dulwich	2	Kent and Canterbury	1
Great Ormond Street	2	Medway	2
Guys	12	Maidstone General	5
Hackney	1	William Harvey, Ashford	2
Hammersmith	3		
Harefield	1	Sussex:	
Joyce Green	1	East Grinstead, Sussex	28
King’s College	10	Eastbourne, Sussex	1
Maida Vale	1		
Maudsley	6	Other:	
Queen Elizabeth, Woolwich	3	Ashford, Middlesex	1
Roehampton	2	Bangor, north Wales	1
Royal Free	2	Prestwick, Scotland	1
St Thomas’s	5	Queen Elizabeth, Birmingham	1
University College	1	Rotherham, South Yorkshire	1
Westminster	1	Southampton General,	
Whipps Cross	1	Hampshire	1
		Stoke Mandeville,	
		Buckinghamshire	4

2.5 Operations in the study period

Appendix B contains details of every flight made during the 14-week (three month) study. During that period, quite significant changes in operations were made, and it is convenient for the purposes of analyses to divide the weeks into three monthly periods as follows:

Month

1	Week 1 (3 days only)	16-18 March 1990
	Week 2	22-26 March
	Week 3	29 March – 2 April
	Week 4	5-9 April
	Week 5 (incl Easter)	12-16 April

Month

2	Week 6	19-23 April
	Week 7	28-30 April (only operated 3 days)
	Week 8 (incl Bank Hol)	3-8 May (operated 6 days)
	Week 9	10-14 May (only operated 4 days: not on the 11th)

Month

3	Week 10	18-21 May (only operated 4 days)
	Week 11 (incl Bank Hol)	26-28 May (only operated 3 days)
	Week 12	30 May – 4 June (operated 6 days)
	Week 13	7-11 June
	Week 14	13-18 June (operated 6 days)

The study concentrated on the period after the ambulance dispute and therefore also excluded the early period when both KAS Control and the crew were learning how the service might be run.

During the study period 346 flights were operated, as shown in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 – Flight operations during the study period

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3	Total
Primary flights	74	45	101	220
Secondary flights	19	25	38	82
Tertiary flights	14	15	15	44
Total flights	107	85	154	346
Days operated	23	18	24	65
Flights per day	4.7	4.7	6.4	5.3
Flying time (mins)	2291	2025	3147	7463
Flying time/day (mins)	99.6	112.5	131.1	114.8
Flying time/flight (min)	21.4	23.8	20.4	21.6

During the beginning of Month 1, long distance inter-hospital transfers were not uncommon but, due to possibly funding problems, overall operations were restricted towards the end of that month and at the beginning of Month 2, and longer distance trips were beginning to be curtailed. By the beginning of Month 3, operations had been restored but the decision was taken to limit long distance transfers to a minimum. During Month 3, which included one Bank Holiday and the beginning of the summer holiday period, the helicopter was particularly busy and a third again as many flights were made per day compared to the previous two months. There is, however, remarkable consistency in terms of average flying time per flight made, at between 20 and 24 minutes.

Despite these operating policy changes, the percentage of flights which were to Primary Incidents (accidents and emergencies) dropped from 58 per cent in Month 1 to 53 per cent in Month 2 and rose again to 66 per cent in Month 3. The average over the study period was 64 per cent.

The nature of the Primary Incidents to which the helicopter was called out are shown in Table 2.6. (Because two flights generated two patients each, and due to the nature of the records used, the total comes to 222, rather than 220 as shown above.) Of these, 127 were road traffic accidents (RTAs), forming 57 per cent of the total number of calls to Primary Incidents; 23 of the RTAs were on a motorway (18 per cent of all RTAs). Sudden illness accounted for 30 calls (14 per cent) and sports injuries for 20 (9 per cent).

Table 2.6 – Primary incidents to which helicopter was called

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3	Total
RTAs	38	32	57	127
of which: Motorway	5	7	11	23
Isle of Grain	1			1
Isle of Sheppey	2		2	4
Sudden illness	8	4	18	30
of which: Motorway	2	1	1	4
Isle of Sheppey	3	2	2	7
Sports injuries	11	4	5	20
of which: Isle of Sheppey			1	1
Falls	1	5	4	10
of which: Motorway		1		1
Isle of Sheppey			1	1
Work/industrial injuries	5	0	2	7
of which: Motorway			2	2
Attempted suicides	1		2	3
of which: Isle of Sheppey			1	1
Other	0	1	4	5
Cause not stated	9	1	9	19
of which: Isle of Sheppey			1	1
Hoax call	1			1
Total Primary Incidents	74	47	101	222
of which: Motorway	7	9	14	30
Isle of Grain	1			1
Isle of Sheppey	5	2	8	15

In all, 30 incidents (14 per cent of the total) were on or beside motorways and 15 (7 per cent) on the Isle of Sheppey – disproportionately high in relation to the island's population.

Obviously not all calls result in a patient being carried by the helicopter, and Table 2.7 gives the data for those patients who were conveyed to hospital, in terms of the cause of the incident. In all, 104 patients were carried to hospital from Primary Incidents to which the helicopter was called, representing 0.47 per incident (roughly equivalent to 47 per cent of the calls generating a patient; the figure is not exact as some incidents generated more than one patient). The ratio is not, however, consistent across all types of incident and the figure for RTAs is noticeably lower at 0.35; this is due to practice of dispatching the helicopter to RTAs, especially on motorways, even when the extent of the injuries are unknown, because of the high probability of serious injury. Information on road accident victims' conditions are often less good than for other incidents, not least because many 999 calls come in from passing motorists using car 'phones. The helicopter may then be cancelled en

route, as further information becomes available from the various emergency services on the scene, or the helicopter crew may treat and stabilise the patients who are then carried by land ambulance.

Table 2.7 – Nature of incidents from which patients conveyed

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3	Total
RTAs	15	5	25	45
of which: Motorway	3	1	5	9
Isle of Grain	1			1
Isle of Sheppey	1		2	3
Sudden illness	7	3	9	19
of which: Motorway	2		1	3
Isle of Sheppey	3			3
Sports injuries	10	5*	5	20
of which: Isle of Sheppey			1	1
* 2 carried on 1 flight				
Falls	1	3	4	8
of which: Motorway		1		1
Isle of Sheppey			1	1
Work/industrial injuries	3	0	2	5
of which: Motorway			2	2
Attempted suicides	1	0	2	3
of which: Isle of Sheppey			1	1
Other	0	1	2	3
Cause not stated	0	0	1	1
Total Patients conveyed	37	17	50	104
of which: Motorway	5	2	8	15
Isle of Grain	1			1
Isle of Sheppey	4		5	9

There are also instances of no patient at all being conveyed from a reported road accident, or even of no evidence of an accident being found on arrival at the reported location.

Conversely, all the attempted suicides and most of the patients with sports injuries, falls and industrial/works injuries to whom the helicopter was sent were then carried by it. About two-thirds of the cases of sudden illness were carried by the helicopter.

In line with the proportions for RTAs, half the motorway incidents resulted in a patient being conveyed by helicopter and 60 per cent of those on the Isle of Sheppey.

On average, 1.6 patients were conveyed to hospital by helicopter on each operating day. Month 1 was near the average figure, but the number was below 1 in Month 2 and rose to over 2 in Month 3.

The medical justification for the use of the helicopter in different instances is discussed in Section 4.

3 Cost aspects and alternative options

3.1 Historical costs of operation

Estimates of the cost of the helicopter ambulance service are based upon the following assumptions:

Fixed costs (paid to McAlpine) in £ per month:

Standing charges	15,000
Maintenance contract	3,500
Insurance (hull/3rd party)	2,500
Pilot	3,750
<hr/>	
Total per month	£ 24,750

Variable costs are set per flying hour as follows:

Provision for overhaul	165 (paid to McAlpine)
Fuel	50 (paid to refuellers)
<hr/>	
Total per hour	£ 215

The relatively high standing charges mean that the unit costs per flight are very sensitive to the utilisation, as the calculations in Table 3.1 show for the study period.

Table 3.1 – Costs of operation

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3	Total
Fixed costs	24,750	24,750	24,750	
Operating costs:				
38.18 hours @ £215	8,209			
33.75 hours @ £215		7,256		
52.45 hours @ £215			11,277	
Total cost per month	32,959	32,006	36,027	100,992
Cost per flight	308	377	234	292
Cost per patient conveyed (primary + secondary)	588	762	409	543

Clearly, the unit costs fall off dramatically the more the aircraft is used, and there is a strong suggestion that it is more cost effective to use it intensively, so long as its use in each case presents some benefits.

If the three-month study period is assumed to be representative, the total annual costs would be just under £404,000, at an average cost of £543 per patient conveyed. If the utilisation can be maintained at Month 3 levels, the annual cost would rise to £432,324 (7 per cent more), but at an average cost of only £409 per patient conveyed (only 75 per cent of the figure above).

In practice, Month 3 benefited from having virtually the longest hours

of daylight of the year and it would be impossible to maintain those levels of utilisation in winter months with one pilot operation restricted to daylight hours. If the average for the three months is taken, the annual utilisation would be a little under 500 hours, in practice it may well be lower (the actual figure for the first year is probably not typical, because of the effect of the ambulance service dispute and also the learning period in how to operate the service).

The other factor which has not been included in the above calculations is the effect of patterns of use on the cost of provision for overhaul. At the time of preparing the figures, McAlpine were thinking of increasing the £165 per hour quoted above, to take account of the greater number of short flights being made with the pattern of operation then being undertaken compared to previous months (the “stop and start” effect).

3.2 Alternative patterns of operation

At present the helicopter operates for eight (or at the most 10) hours a day, five days a week, with one pilot. This restricts the period of operation to less than the common times of day when road accidents, in particular, occur. To extend the period of daylight operation, which would be feasible especially during the summer period, would require one additional pilot.

This would add about £50,000 per annum to the operating cost (McAlpine would wish to charge more for the second pilot than for their present pilot who is made available virtually at cost) but would permit seven day a week operation with longer days operated when daylight permits in the summer. An annual average utilisation of about 700 hours could be achieved at an annual cost broken down as follows:

Standing charges as now	297,000	
Extra pilot	50,000	
700 hours @, say, £225	157,500	allowing for the increase in provision for overhaul
Total	£ 504,500	
Cost per hour	£ 720	
Cost per flight	£ 259	if the pattern of the study period were maintained, ie 21.6 mins per flight.

An increased expenditure of £100,000 per annum (about 25 per cent of the present) would thus result not only in significantly increased availability but also in a notional decrease from £292 to £259 (about a 12 per cent saving) in the cost per flight. This is an attractive option, especially during summer months.

To cover the hours of darkness to a significant extent, three pilots would be required; this would provide 20 hours/day service five days a week and 10 hours/day on two days. This is not considered a viable option, considering the pattern of ambulance demand and the reduced utilisation that would be likely to occur during night-time hours because of the very limited number of landing sites that could be used.

At present, the helicopter does not have a back-up for down-times.

Although routine maintenance and checks are carried out as far as possible during the Tuesday-Wednesday rest days, nearly 18 per cent of the basic potential operating hours were lost in the first 51 weeks due to maintenance and technical failures carried out on scheduled operating days (although the hours were then boosted back to a slightly greater extent by overtime and rest day working). It is not feasible to have a back-up aircraft, but if there were to be more extensive helicopter ambulance coverage (say, six or eight aircraft for south-east England), it could be feasible to provide one back-up aircraft for the whole area.

4 Benefits from the service

4.1 Identification of benefits

The potential benefits from the service can be divided into five main areas:

- (a) Saving of loss of life
- (b) Prevention of long-term disability
- (c) Reduction in pain and suffering
- (d) Reduction in medical care needed
- (e) Savings in the provision of land ambulances.

Not all of these items can be quantified at present. In particular the Department of Transport is undertaking a major revision of the values to be used in relation to road accident savings in its road investment appraisal. (The Department's figures are possibly the most relevant in the context of this study.) Some consideration is given below to the latest thinking in this field.

4.2 Saving of loss of life

The valuation of life has traditionally been undertaken in the road safety field, as an input to highway appraisal techniques. The classical method, which was used until recently, relied on the pioneering work of Dawson (1967), who established from empirical research the component costs of fatal, serious and slight road accidents, including vehicle and property damage, and the costs of medical and other services. A major element of this was the discounted value of the injured person's lost production or output from which was subtracted the value of the consumption forgone, to produce a net value of the loss to society. As it was assumed that elderly people have a net consumption, the value of their lives (or non-productive time while injured) was calculated at a negative amount; to avoid this, an arbitrary subjective cost was added in all cases (usually known as "pain, grief and suffering") such that all people had a positive value of life.

The benefits of Dawson's approach were that the elements of the calculations were transparent, could be indexed to current prices and also applied in other countries if necessary. However, the arbitrary amount remained philosophically displeasing and, over time, assumed an overwhelming importance in the total valuation.

A recent review of the standard method of the valuation of life by Jones-Lee (see, for example, *ibid* 1990) for the Department of Transport used the "willingness to pay" approach to risk minimisation, in which people's expressed willingness to pay for small reductions in risk was extrapolated to the point where the value to them of death-avoidance could be estimated.

Dawson, RFF, 1967. Cost of road accidents in Great Britain, RRL Report LR 79, Road Research Laboratory, Crowthorne.

Jones-Lee, MW, 1990. The value of transport safety, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2.

This produced a range of values for life, from which a conservative figure of £500,000 was initially selected by the Department of Transport (1988). The latest figure in use by the Department is £608,600 in June 1989 prices. Inflating this to June 1990 (at 9.11 per cent per annum) gives a figure relevant to the study period of **£664,043**. (There still remains, however, some debate about the approach and alternative methods are also available (see Dalvi, 1988).)

4.3 Prevention of long-term disability

Methods of costing the effects of long-term and permanent disability (to the individual and to society) are beginning to be established and, depending on the age and circumstances of the victim, can be estimated with some degree of precision. For younger people, the cost would be likely to exceed the standard valuation of a death. Each individual case ideally needs to be considered on its merits.

4.4 Reduction in pain and suffering

Valuation in this area is complex. Use of the helicopter should reduce the time for which a patient suffers, as the paramedics on board can administer pain-killing drugs and also as the patient arrives earlier in hospital. As a proportion of the total pain and suffering accruing from the incident in the longer term, however, this may be small.

Research at the Universities of Newcastle-upon-Tyne and East Anglia is being carried out for the Department of Transport into people's "willingness to pay" to reduce the risk of serious and slight injuries; this includes consideration not just of pain and suffering but also, and probably more significantly, of loss of earnings and the inconvenience of temporary or permanent disability of various levels. The pilot studies into survey methods were completed at the end of 1990 and it is expected that contracts will be let shortly for the main research, which will not be reported until the end of 1991 or in 1992.

Best estimates are that the results will be of the order of £30-40,000 for a serious injury accident and £1-2,000 for a "slight" (Jones-Lee, 1990: unpublished correspondence). These compare with the Dawson arbitrary figure for pain and suffering alone which was latterly set at about £50,000 in the case of fatal RTAs, £9,000 for serious injury accidents and £130 for slight accidents.

4.5 Reduction in medical care needed

Again, there is considerable lack of clarity about the likely savings to be expected from presenting a patient to hospital with some pre-admission treatment and in a quicker time. It appears self-evident that if there is an effect it must be beneficial. Some sources (mainly foreign) suggest that an average of two-three days in hospital may be saved. However medical personnel in Kent are more sceptical and have proved reluctant to give estimates for individual cases in this regard during the course of the study.

Department of Transport, 1988. Valuation of road accident fatalities.
Dalvi, MQ, 1988. The value of life and safety: a search for a consensus estimate, Department of Transport.

4.6 Savings in the provision of land ambulances

Estimates of time savings have been provided by KAS Control for most, but not all, of the incidents reported and these can be quantified against the unit costs of emergency ambulance provision at £95 per call out, about £42 an hour.

It should be noted that, until the helicopter service is further rationalised into the front line ambulance service, many primary incidents are attended by both the helicopter and a land ambulance, thus savings in this regard are minimal. However the majority of time savings accrue during inter-hospital transfers and are real savings, especially if the land ambulance savings can be realised in terms of long-term reductions in the numbers of personnel and vehicles. In the short term, while the future of the helicopter service is uncertain, these savings will not be realised to their fullest extent.

4.7 Assessment of the benefits from helicopter operation

The Accident and Emergency Consultant who gave his time to work on the study, Jim Walker, appraised the use of the helicopter in each case (whether or not a patient was conveyed in it), and the various hospital Consultants treating the patients conveyed were asked to provide follow-up information in cases where significant benefits appeared to be likely. The combined assessments are shown in the records contained in Appendix B. They are necessarily subjective and their interpretation in this analysis may not be entirely consistent.

The assessments cover several different categories and some incidents fall into more than one. Subjective judgement has been used to categorise each incident into the group which appears to be the most significant. The base for the following figures has been taken as 220 Primary Incidents and 82 Secondary transfers.

- (a) Cases where calling out the helicopter was justified at the time in view of the likely state of the (or any) patient to be treated or conveyed but in the absence of any further information.

This applies particularly to RTAs on motorways, where high speeds may have been involved, and falls from horses, bicycles and the like, where head injuries may have been caused. Where accidents or injuries are reported which specifically include references to heads and necks, where the patient is reported to be unconscious or bleeding externally (or suspected to be bleeding internally), it is considered quite justified to dispatch the helicopter. This category also includes the situation where, from the information available, it appears possible that the patient might need specialist treatment for burns, or micro-surgery, as quickly as possible. These are cases where on arrival or with the benefit of subsequent medical examination, the calls proved not to have been "medically justified" in terms of dealing with a life-threatening condition but there is no criticism of the Ambulance Control for their decision to send the helicopter on the basis of information available to them at the time.

These were 15 Primary cases that fitted this description and 1 Secondary transfer.

There is no evident benefit from this type of use, except to be sure that all eventualities are covered.

- (b) Cases where use of the helicopter was not strictly justified on known medical grounds but was deemed to be “humane” or “kind” in terms of relief of pain and anxiety:

Examples of these would be accidents some way from a road, where the alternative would be to be jolted in a road vehicle or carried on a stretcher; extremely elderly or very young patients who may themselves, or whose relatives may be, very distressed by a condition which is not in itself life-threatening; also very painful conditions such as serious fractures or sub arachnoid haemorrhages where transfer to hospital as quickly as possible would provide relief.

There were 13 Primary cases in this group and 6 Secondary transfers.

The benefits from this type of use are humanitarian and not readily quantified in the absence of some standard for quantifying pain and suffering.

- (c) Cases where the location of the incident made it very expedient to use the helicopter (motorways, aerodromes, playing fields, remote rural areas) even though it was known at the time that the patient was not in a particularly serious or painful condition:

20 such Primary cases were identified.

The benefits are mainly in terms of savings in land ambulance costs.

- (d) Cases where the prevention of disability might be expected by a rapid and smooth transfer to specialised care (suspected broken necks and spines in particular):

There were two such Primary cases and in one the consultant, while not prepared to be dogmatic, was of the view that **permanent disability was likely to have been prevented** by using the helicopter rather than a land ambulance (flight 532): the patient had multiple injuries including a fractured spine from an RTA at Brooklands on Romney Marsh. It has not proved possible to set a quantified level of probability on this “probable or possible prevention of disability”, nor to cost what disability would have meant to this man of 42 without more details of his personal circumstances, but there are clearly large and tangible potential benefits to be multiplied by a significant percentage probability.

- (e) Cases where the patient appeared to be in a life-threatening situation requiring immediate emergency treatment only available in hospital or a specialist unit:

Patients reported to have had a heart attack, or found on arrival to have a low coma score or massive bleeding are examples of this category. In most cases, either on follow-up the consultant treating

the patient did not believe that the faster transfer to hospital afforded by the helicopter had saved the patient's life, or conversely the patient died despite being conveyed by helicopter. In some cases the patient was found to be already dead on the arrival of the helicopter.

There were 19 Primary cases and 7 Secondary cases in this category.

Two Primary cases were judged by the consultants treating them subsequently to have been **very appropriate indeed** for conveyance by helicopter. Flight 502 carried a 63 year old man, involved in an RTA on the M20 and complaining of chest pains. Flight 524 carried a roadside collapse with chest pains of a 38 year old man at Lenham. Neither consultant would go so far as to say that the man's life had been saved, but even a small probability that this was the case would yield tangible economic benefits.

In one further Primary case, however, the consultant involved is adamant that **the patient's life was saved**: flight 428 carried a 25 year old man who had been involved in an RTA on the A299 near St Nicholas at Wade (between Herne Bay and Margate). He had multiple fractures injuries including an (undiagnosed) ruptured spleen. He was treated with oxygen and splinted on the ground, and then taken to Kent and Canterbury Hospital, arriving within 34 minutes of the helicopter receiving the call, where he was operated on immediately. His consultant is convinced that had the patient travelled by road, he would have bled to death before he could have been operated on.

The Department of Transport's inflation adjusted figure of £664,043 for the cost of a fatal RTA includes some element for the cost of vehicle damage, etc., but most of it reflects the real value of the life and this order of benefit must be ascribed to this one use of the helicopter ambulance.

- (f) Cases where no patient was conveyed by helicopter but where the paramedics appear from the available data to have supplied some treatment on the site (assumed to be all cases where the helicopter stayed at the scene for 5 minutes or more but one or more patients were conveyed by land ambulance):

There were 32 Primary Incidents that meet these criteria. There should be some tangible benefit from the treatment provided but the data as collected do not allow these to be explored in more detail.

The Land Ambulance savings are a separate issue. The estimates provided by KAS were not entirely complete and some extrapolation has been necessary to reach the following conclusions:

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3	Study period
Time saved (mins)	6324	6008	8125	20,457
(hours)	105.4	100.1	135.4	340.9
Time saved/patient conveyed (mins)	112.9	143.0	92.3	110.0
Total cost saving at £42/hour	£ 4426.8	4204.2	5686.8	14,319.9
Cost saving/patient conveyed	£ 79.0	100.1	64.6	77.0

If these three months are typical, the notional annual saving would be of the order of £57,000. However, as may be inferred from 4.6 above, to realise this saving would require changes to be made at the margin to the level of provision of the land ambulance service which may not be practical.

In summary therefore, the benefits observed from three months' operation of the helicopter ambulance comprise:

Considerable savings in pain and suffering	19
Likely prevention of para/tetraplegia	1
Lives possibly saved	2
Life definitely saved	1
Notional financial savings to KAS	£ 14,320

5 Summary and conclusions

The Kent helicopter ambulance service has now been in operation for just over a year, providing paramedic attendance at accident and emergencies and the transport of accident and emergency patients and urgent inter-hospital transfers.

It has proved its operational viability, in terms of the performance of the aircraft, pilot and paramedic crews, without question and has by now made over 1,000 flights, two-thirds of them to the scene of "Primary Incidents" (emergencies and accidents). It typically (on average across the whole of the county) reaches the scene within 10 minutes of being called and on average flies the patient to hospital in a little over 5 minutes from the scene of the incident.

During the three months of the study, 104 patients were taken to hospital from Primary Incidents and 82 urgent transfers were made, mostly to specialist regional centres of investigation or treatment. In addition, somewhat over 30 incidents occurred where the paramedic crews appear to have treated patients for subsequent conveyance to hospital by land (road) ambulance.

Over 40 per cent of the patients carried from Primary Incidents were victims of RTAs, of whom 20 per cent had been involved in an accident on a motorway. In all, 14 per cent of all patients were lifted off from a motorway site to which access might otherwise prove difficult or lengthy (these include construction workers and cases of sudden illness as well as victims of RTAs). Many of the urgent transfers were also RTA victims requiring specialist treatment. Accidents and illnesses on the Isle of Sheppey accounted for 9 per cent of the patients carried, and other remote rural areas also generated disproportionately high numbers of patients in relation to the population. Accidents on farms, aerodromes and sports fields featured strongly, for reasons of access.

The cost of the service is running at about £400,000 a year, almost entirely funded by public contribution. An increase in expenditure to about £500,000 a year would enable more extensive coverage to be provided: seven days a week instead of five, and longer hours especially during the long light days of summer.

In the three month period studied, the benefits observed were wide ranging and many of them unquantifiable. Specifically, in the view of the medical consultants treating them (who tend if anything to be very conservative), one victim of an RTA definitely had his life saved, at an economic valuation of over £600,000 in benefits, two further lives (one an RTA) were quite possibly saved and one man (also an RTA) was probably saved from tetraplegia. All were men of working age, the man whose life was saved (and has now been discharged from hospital) being 25 with a lifetime of useful work ahead of him.

There were less tangible and unquantifiable benefits in the relief of pain and suffering and from presenting patients to hospital in rather better condition, in a much larger number of cases. These benefits accrue both

from the speed of the journey and from the rapid deployment to the scene of the paramedical team on board the helicopter. In over 30 cases, they were able to treat patients who were subsequently carried by road.

Notional savings to the Kent Ambulance Service of over £14,000 were also made in the cost of operating land ambulances during the quarter in question.

It is therefore clear that in economic terms the Kent helicopter ambulance has more than proved its worth.

The residual problems lie in the funding base and in the increased utilisation of the helicopter to lower the unit cost of its heavy standing charges.

Useful lessons can perhaps be learned from other services, especially that in Northumbria where creative use of standard ambulance service resources in 1990 generated revenue to cover the operating costs of an almost identical aircraft.

It has been speculated that comprehensive national coverage could be provided with something like 20 helicopters; it was not the task of this study to estimate this number more precisely. In view of the proven worth of the Kent service, however, it would be well worth considering in more detail the nature of such a scheme, how it could be operated and, most importantly, how it could be funded. Again, estimates are bandied about as to the modest additions to motor insurance premiums or AA subscriptions that would need to be made to fund such a scheme. Comparisons are drawn with continental European experience, especially in Germany where private health insurance pays the full costs. In contrast, the five British services (Kent, Northumbria, London, Scotland's Highlands and Islands, and Cornwall) are funded in a miscellany of ways, with no integration of approach either to operation or monitoring. Further investigation of the other four operations in a similar, or more detailed, manner than the present study could be helpful.

Developments currently in hand through Department of Transport-sponsored research into the economic valuation of non-fatal road traffic accidents should be monitored so that the results can be applied to the findings of this and similar studies as they become available.

More detailed appraisal and quantification of the benefits of this and other helicopter ambulance services (other than by the application of norms such as will be derived in the research mentioned above) would necessitate case studies of individual patients, using a tracking system and specialist accident and emergency medical personnel.

6 Appendices

A Samples of data record forms

The following two sheets show the form used to record each flight carried out by the Kent helicopter ambulance (variations exist for Secondary and Tertiary flights) and the standard AMB46 which is completed by all ambulance crews (air or land) carrying a patient to hospital. These provided the data used in the analysis shown in Appendix B and used in the body of this report.

HELICOPTER PROJECT AUDIT

PRIMARY INCIDENT

DATE

23.4.90.

FLIGHT NUMBER

~~7444~~ 317

CASE NUMBER

~~1000~~ 251

LOCATION

M2 Junction 5-6 Coastbound RT.A.

PATIENT NAME

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

PICK UP FROM

M2.

TAKE TO

M.G.H.

RESPONSE

☒ Sole ☐ Joint ☐ Attend Only

LOCATION OF HELICOPTER WHEN INITIATED

Base.

TIME OF CALL

1503.

TIME TO AIRBORNE

1505.

min 2

TIME ON SCENE

1512.

min 7

TIME AT SCENE

min 7

TIME LEFT SCENE

1519

min —

TIME AT HOSPITAL

1527.

min 8

TIME CLEAR AT HOSPITAL

1544.

min 17

R.T.B.?

☒ Yes ☐ No

TIME BACK AT BASE

1548.

min 4

OVERALL CASE TIME

min 45

STATIC TIME AT HOSPITAL

min 17.

DISTANCE LANDED FROM INCIDENT

metres 15.

TERRAIN

Motorway.

ATTEMPTED LANDINGS

1.

SERVICES ON SCENE

POLICE.

SERVICES REQUESTED

—

PATIENT

Male, ☒ Female, ☒ Adult, ☐ Child, ☐ Neo-nate

AGE

years 34.

MEDICAL CONDITION

Whiplash + Injury(L) Hand.

AGGRESSIVE TREATMENT

Analgesia, Intubate, Drug, Fluid, CPR, Vent, Defib

RESPONSE TIME/LAND AMB

OVERALL MISSION TIME/LAND AMB

Longer, Equal, ☒ Shorter

MEDICAL OUTCOME [Use of helicopter]

Non-Valid, ☒ Similar, ☐ Vital

CREW 1 (ET)

ADAMS.

CREW 2

STAMP

Signature:

M Adams.

AL NO. 23.4 90		FINISH MILEAGE		NAME		TIME OF CALL 1503	
ON ROCHESTER		START MILEAGE		ADDRESS		MOBILE 1505	
SIGN KA VEH. No. G SETA		TOTAL				AT SCENE 1512	
V: 1) ADAMS		IN ATTENDANCE				LEFT SCENE 1519	
2) STAMP		POLICE (No.)		MALE		AT HOSPITAL 1527	
AGENT RTA		FIRE		FEMALE		CHANGES IN TRANSIT	
LOCATION BETWEEN JUNCTION 5-6 M2		DOCTOR		AGE 34		GENERAL CONDITION	
BASE				RECEIVING HOSPITAL MGH		BLOOD FROM	
CLASSIFICATION STR		GLASGOW COMA SCALE		DH		WK	
EYE OPENING		SPONTANEOUS TO SPEECH TO PAIN NIL		1		2	
MOTOR RESPONSE		OBEYS LOCALIZES FLEXION WITHDRAWAL EXTENSOR RESPONSE NIL		1		2	
VERBAL RESPONSE		ORIENTATED CONFUSED CONVERSATION INAPPROPRIATE WORDS INCOMPREHENSIBLE SOUNDS NIL		1		2	
TIMED 1 2		TOTAL 14					
BREATHING		CIRCULATION		COLOUR		PUPILS	
ABSENT SHALLOW DEEP NORMAL REGULAR IRREGULAR RATE PER MIN		B.P. PULSE RATE REGULAR IRREGULAR NORMAL VOL: WEAK VOL: BLOOD LOSS		NORMAL CYANOSD PALE SWEATING TIMED		REACTION TO LIGHT	
TIMED 1 2		TIMED 1 2					
HYTHMIAS		SINO ATRIAL BLOCK		SINUS RHYTHM		VENTRICULAR EXTRASYSTOLE	
RT RATE		1° AV BLOCK		SINUS BRADYCARDIA		IDIOVENTRICULAR RHYTHM	
		2° AV BLOCK (WENKEBACH)		SINUS TACHYCARDIA		VENTRICULAR TACHYCARDIA	
		2° AV BLOCK (MOBITZ II)		ATRIAL/JUNC EXTRASYSTOLE		VENTRICULAR FIBRILLATION	
		3° AV BLOCK (NARROW QRS)		JUNCTIONAL RHYTHM		PROBABLE INFARCT PATTERN	
		3° AV BLOCK (WIDE QRS)		SUPRAVENTRICULAR/TACHYCARDIA		ST/T CHANGES	
		ASYSTOLE WITH P WAVES		ATRIAL FLUTTER		LEFT BUNDLE BRANCH BLOCK	
		ASYSTOLE WITHOUT P WAVES		ATRIAL FIBRILLATION		RIGHT BUNDLE BRANCH BLOCK	
NG YES/NO		INFUSION FLUID		QUANTITY		TIME	
ONSE:							
		DRUG		AMOUNT		ROUTE	
		OXYGEN				TIME	
		ENTONOX				RESPONSE	
						BY	
						I DO NOT WISH TO BE TAKEN TO HOSPITAL ALTHOUGH I HAVE BEEN ADVISED TO GO BY THE AMBULANCE CREW.	
						SIGNED	

ASKED TO CALL: VIA CONTROL/VIA OUR TELEPHONE CALL. TIMED.

OTHER COMMENTS

Whiplash + Injury (R) Hand

B Data on three months' operations

The following pages contain records of each flight made by the helicopter, divided up by week. The key to abbreviations used is as follows:

Flt	Flight number from KAS records	} both have some irregularities
Case	Case number from KAS records	
Flt Type	Flight Type:	
P, S, T	Primary, Secondary, Tertiary Incident/flight	
In Flt	Time spent in flight to first landing or stand-down or diversion (all times in minutes)	
On Grd	Time spent on the ground at incident or at first hospital in case of transfers	
To Hosp	Time spent flying to hospital or to second hospital in case of transfers	
At Hosp	Time spent at hospital or at second hospital in case of transfers	
cf LA	Time saving compared to use of land ambulance	
Incid.	Type of Incident:	
	RTA	Road traffic accident
	Trans	Transfer
	Works	Works accidents
	Sport	Sports injury
	N/S	Not stated
	O/D	Overdose
	Ill	Sudden Illness
	LOX	Liquid oxygen refill
(M)	Incident on or beside Motorway	
IS	Incident on Isle of Sheppey	
IG	Incident on Isle of Grain	
/	not applicable	
#	Fracture	
NPC	No patient conveyed	
KAS "Urgent"	Transfer rated urgent by Kent Ambulance Service	
Pat conv LA	Patient conveyed by land ambulance	
NR	Helicopter found not to be required on arrival	
Not ess	Use of helicopter not considered to have been essential from evidence at time and/or follow-up	
Exp	Expedient	
Exp loc'n	Expedient use for location of incident	

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 1															
190	143	16.3.90	P	2	3	1	/	/	2	8	/	RTA			NPC
191	144	16.3.90	P	1	9	22	7	6	11	56	32	RTA	# Ribs?	Poss int bl.	Valid use
192	145	16.3.90	S	2	5	24	11	2	13	57	180	Trans	Decap fing	Poss micro surg	Not ess.
193	146	17.3.90	P	1					10	11	/				Cancelled
194		17.3.90	T						10	10	/				LOX
195	147	17.3.90	P	/	9	12	9	15	10	55	60	RTA(M)	Whiplash	No evid # neck	Not ess.
196	148	17.3.90	P	2	/	/	2	39	5	48	45	Works	Cut finger		Not ess.: PR?
197	149	17.3.90	P	1					10	11	/				Cancelled
198	150	17.3.90	S	2	13	15	20	20	15	85	240	Trans	Sub Ar Haem	Intense pain	Justified
199	151	18.3.90	P	1					21	22	/	RTA			Cancelled
200	152	18.3.90	P	1	7	12	4	20	11	55	45	RTA(M)	Whiplash	No evid # neck	Exp (location)
Totals				13	46	86	53	102	118	418					

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 2															
201		22.3.90	T						40	40	/	PR			Film crew
202		23.3.90	T						8	8	/	LOX			
203	153	23.3.90	S	3	3	24	12	22	10	74	240	Trans	CVA	KAS "Urgent"	Prob not ess.
204	154	23.3.90	P	1	4	7			7	19	/	N/S			NR
205	155	23.3.90	S	3	12	21	24	9	19	88	300	Trans	Shunt	KAS "Urgent"	Prob not ess.
206	156	24.3.90	P	2	5	5			6	18	/	N/S			NR
207	157	24.3.90	P	2	12	5			8	27	/	RTA	Head injuries?	(not seen)	LA conveyed
208		25.3.90	T						8	8	/	LOX			
209		25.3.90	T						10	10	/	PR			Visit Olau Line
210	158	25.3.90	P	2	8	11	6	19	12	58	15	Sport	# Tib/Fib?	Painful	Not life-saving
211	159	25.3.90	P	2	9	14	2	27	18	72	30	Sport	# Tib/Fib?	Painful	Not life-saving
212	160	25.3.90	P	2	3	19	3	30	3	60	35	RTA(M)	Hd/leg/abdm	Low coma score	Prob good use
213		26.3.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
214	161	26.3.90	P	0	10	13	6	11	0	40	35	RTA	Wplsh/chest	Not ess	Just. at time
215	162	26.3.90	S	12	7	25	16	11	11	82	150	Trans	Cirrhosis	Not ess	
Totals				29	73	144	69	129	170	616					

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 3															
216	163	29.3.90	S	2	4	46	16	47	10	125	120	Trans	Back injury	No symptoms	Prob not ess.
217	164	29.3.90	S	0	13	22	106*	21	82	244	840	Trans	# Femur	Exp cf LA	Expedient
											* incl 20 mins refuelling stop + o/nt stay				
218	165	30.3.90	S	3	25	23	27	7	13	98	270	Trans	Brain Tumr.		Transport use
219	166	31.3.90	S	34	11	80*	20	15	13	173	210	Trans	Spin Cmprsn	KAS "Urgent"	Transport use
											* delays through weather				
220	167	31.3.90	P	1	9	9	5	13	/	37	75	RTA	Scapula	Not vital	Not ess.
221	168	31.3.90	P	1	9	13			7	30	/	RTA	Arm/mouth		Pat conv LA
222	169	1.4.90	P	2					5	7	/	RTA			N/R
223	170	1.4.90	P	2	15	2			17	36	/	RTA			N/R
224	171	1.4.90	S	2	4	18	17	15	18	74	210	Trans	22% burns	KAS "Urgent"	Not ess. on F/up
225	172	1.4.90	P	2	14	22	3	22	19	82	30	RTA	Concussion	High coma score	Not ess.
226	173	1.4.90	P	1	9	26	8	32	4	80	90	RTA IG	Cut head	Not approp.	Not ess.
227	174	2.4.90	S	28*	5	23	14	21	12	103	150	Trans	Skin graft	Expedient only	Not ess.
											* from time called to arrange pick-up				
228	175	2.4.90	P	1	4	11	/	/	/	16	/	Works	N/S		Pat conv LA
229	176	2.4.90	P	0	6	9	8	27	3	53	60	Works	# Tib/arm	Nice, not ess.	Painful
Totals				79	128	304	204	220	203	1158					
											+20 refuelling				

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 4															
230		5.4.90	T							8	/	LOX			
231	177	5.4.90	S	0	17	14	26	42	12	111	270	Trans	MI (wrong)	Not ess on f/up	Just. at time
232	178	5.4.90	P	1	4	22	7	27	4	65	45	RTA	Head/back	Prob not ess	Prob not ess
233	179	5.4.90	P	1	10	9			9	30	/	N/S	N/S		Pat conv LA
234	180	6.4.90	P	2	10	14	8	13	16	63	23	RTA	Chest pain	Prob not ess	Prob not ess
235	181	6.4.90	P	1					13	14	/	Works	Spike in foot		Cancelled
236	182	6.4.90	P	2	7				/	9	/	Sport			Canc.: P C car
237	183	6.4.90	P	/	7	14	3	19	4	47	60	O/D	Sl. drowsy	Prob not ess	Prob. not ess
238	184	6.4.90	S	2	12	18	11	13	11	67	90	Trans	# Hip	Expedient	Transport use
239		7.4.90	T						8	8	/	LOX			
240	185	7.4.90	P	1	3	18	6	22	/	50	30	Ill(M)	Ep. Fit	Not ess	Not ess
241	186	7.4.90	P	/					5	5	/	N/S			Cancelled
242	187	7.4.90	P	2					6	8	/	N/S			Cancelled
243	188	7.4.90	P	0	7	14	5	18	5	49	40	Ill(M)	Collapsed	Just. at time	Exp loc'n
244	189	7.4.90	P	1	6	11	2	28	4	52	15	Sport	# Ankle	Prob not ess	Prob not ess
245	190	7.4.90	P	2	6	8	2	18	/	36	5	Ag/Wks	Back	Exp loc'n	Bumpy access:
246	191	7.4.90	P	/	17				13	30	/	N/S			Canc o/h site
247	192	7.4.90	P	0	15	17	4	24	13	73	13	Sport?	#Tib/ankle	Prob not ess	Prob not ess
248	193	8.4.90	P	3	10	5			10	28	12	RTA?			N/R
249	194	8.4.90	P	2	7	33	8	36	8*	94	16	Ill	CVA?(angina)	Prob not ess	
* then called on to next															
250	195	8.4.90	P	/	5	12	6	23	1*	47	3	Fall	# Ribs?	Pat in gd condn	Not vital
* then called on to next															

Cont./ . .

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 4 (cont.)															
251	196	8.4.90	P	/	5	15			6*	26	/	N/S			Pat conv LA
						* then called on to next									
252	197	8.4.90	P	/	10	9*			/	19	/	RTA IS			Pat conv LA
						* then called on to next									
253		8.4.90	T						7	7	/	LOX			
254	198	8.4.90	P	/	5	8			5	18	/	RTA	Minor inj		Pat conv LA
255	199	8.4.90	P	2	5	8	7	25	5	52	90	Sport	# Ankle	Not ess	Not ess
256	200	8.4.90	P	1	4	8	4	16	4*	37	90	Sport	# Ribs?	Not ess	Not ess
						* then called on to next									
257	201	8.4.90	P	/	6	36	7	21	5	75	180	Ill	Coma/Fit	Fitting stopped	Not ess
258		9.4.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
259	202	9.4.90	S	2	15	15	25	14	15	86	240	Trans	N/S	Prob not ess	Prob not ess
260	203	9.4.90	S	2	3	17	8	30	7*	67	180	Trans	N/S	Prob not ess	Prob not ess
						* then called on to next									
261	204	9.4.90	S	/	8	30	11	15	4	68	150	Trans	Amputee	Not ess	
262	205	9.4.90	P	0	10	11			16	37	/	RTA	#Fem/hd inj		Pat conv LA
Totals				27	214		150		226	1396	1552				
										Flying 617					

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 5															
263		12.4.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
264	206	12.4.90	P	1	7	9	4	7	7*	35	25	RTA	Whplsh/back Cerv. collar fitted	Prob. not ess	Exp/comfort
				* then called to next											
265	207	12.4.90	P	/	10	8			5	23	/	RTA(M)	No injury		NPC
266	208	12.4.90	P	1	6*					7	/	RTA			Canc. in flt.
				* call cancelled											
267	208	12.4.90	S	0	10	10	18	12	20	70	180	Trans	#Pelvis/arm	Not ess but comfort/humane	
268	209	12.4.90	S	2	18	8	32	6*	/	66	240	Trans	Ca Oesoph	Not ess	Not ess
				* then called to next											
269	210	12.4.90	P	2	12	1			6	21	/	RTA(M)			Pat conv LA
270	211	12.4.90	P	1	5				4	9	/	RTA			Canc.o/h site
271	212	13.4.90	P	2	5	4			4	15	/	RTA(M)			NPC
272	213	13.4.90	P	2	13	29			15	59	/	III	Collapse	Justified	DOA; LA conv
273	214	13.4.90	P	1	10	6	10	2	3	32	25	III IS	Boil	Not approp	Exp loc'n
274	215	13.4.90	P	1	9				12	22	/	RTA			Canc. in flt.
275	216	13.4.90	S	7	10	6	14	17	15	69	180	Trans	Scald foot	Not ess	Not ess
276	(no such flight – misnumbering)														
277	217	14.4.90	P	3	9	9	5	20	9	55	90	Sport	# ankle	Just. (as horse) but not ess	
278	218	14.4.90	P	1	9	23	8	12	15	68	90	MiscIS	Back inj.	Justified	Justified
279	219	14.4.90	P	3					5	8	/	Hoax?	Collapse		Nothing found
280	220	14.4.90	P	2	12	12	7	15	2*	50	90	Sport	#Wrist	Just. (as horse) but not ess	
				* then called to next											
281	221	14.4.90	P	/	4	19	4	25	14	66	90	Sport	Abdo pain	Just but not ess	

Cont./.

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment	
WEEK 5 (Cont.)																
282		15.4.90	T									LOX				
283	222	15.4.90	P	/*	1	11	8	29	6	55	75	Sport	Cut head; had been unconscious	Not ess	Not ess	
284	223	15.4.90	P	4	4	12	5	20	10*	75	15	RTA	Shock/cuts	Not ess	Not ess	
* time to landing to refuel																
285		15.4.90	T						20				Refuel			
286	224	15.4.90	P	4	10	8			2	24	/	RTA			Pat conv LA	
287	225	15.4.90	P	0	14				22	36	/	RTA			Canc/LA conv	
288	226	15.4.90	P	0	7	3			7	17	/	RTA	Bruise ankle		Pat conv LA	
289	227	15.4.90	P	1	9	12			5*	27	/	RTA	Bruise ankle		NPC	
				* then called to next												
290	228	15.4.90	P	/	8	15	8	32	9	72	60	RTA	Head inj.	No info on f/up	Seems good use	
291		16.4.90	T							10					Reloc. Tent'n	
292	229	16.4.90	P	4	9	7			12	32	/	RTA			Canc o/h site	
293	230	16.4.90	P	3	11	16	7	26	25	88	90	Ill IS	Collapse/ Chest pains (age 75)	Insuff. data	Exp loc'n	
294	231	16.4.90	P	0	9	2			17	28	/	RTA			NR	
295	232	16.4.90	P	0	3	1			8	12	/	RTA IS			NR	
296	233	16.4.90	P	1					6	7	/	RTA			Canc in flt	
297	234	16.4.90	P	1	4	19	5	15	3	47	60	RTA	Head inj	Insuff. data	Prob not ess	
Totals					238		135		288		1215		1310		Flying time 661	

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment	
WEEK 6																
299	236	19.4.90	S	0	7	17	9	8	12	53	90	Trans	Bleeding PV	Exp	Exp	
300	237	19.4.90	S	/*	17	14	56	13	68**	168	480	Trans	Back (RTA)	Not ess	KAS "Urgent"	
				* pre-booked		** stopped off at RTA en route for 30 mins										
301		19.4.90	T						20	20	/	PR	Fund raising			
302		20.4.90	T						10	10	/	LOX				
303	238	20.4.90	P	2	7	3			10	22	/	RTA(M)	NR			
304	239	20.4.90	S	2	15	20	22	18*	13	146	180	Trans	Brain haem	No info on follow-up	KAS "Urgent"	
				* had to carry Dr and return for para-med												
305	240	20.4.90	P	3	1	21			3	28	/	RTA	Just. call		DOA	
306	241	20.4.90	S	/	14	9	23	6	11	63	180	Trans	Cardiac	Not ess but exp	Exp	
307		21.4.90	T						5	5						
308	242	21.4.90	S	6	12	25	26	46	20	135	240	Trans	CO, unconsc (suicide)	Justified as on hi press O ₂	Weather check Justified but	
309	243	21.4.90	S	5	12	16	18	34*			85	180	Trans	Blocked cor by-pass	pat died later KAS "Urgent"	
				* called to next												
310	244	21.4.90	S	5	13	7	11	36*			72	120	Trans	Pacemaker	Not ess	KAS "Urgent"
				* called to next												
311	245	21.4.90	S	/	22	10	25	6	12	75	240	Trans	Pacemaker	Not ess	KAS "Urgent"	
312	246	22.4.90	P	2	9	3			16	30	/	RTA	Heli misdirct. LA found, dealt			
313	247	22.4.90	S	5	3	23	11	43	10	95	120	Trans	Angina	Not ess	KAS "Urgent"	
314	248	22.4.90	P	1	6	11			9	27	/	RTA	Pat conv by car			
315	249	22.4.90	P	1	9	4			12	26	(a) RTA (b) RTA		NR LA dealt			
316	250	23.4.90	S	/	12	30	47	45	28	162	240	Trans	Amptn/paral	Not ess	KAS "Urgent"	
317	251	23.4.90	P	2	7	7	8	17	4	45	90	RTA(M)	Whplsh/hand	Not ess	NE; just. locn.	
Totals				34	166	220	281	303	233	1267	2160					
												+ 30 on gd Flying: 680				

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 7															
318		28.4.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
319	252	28.4.90	P	2	8	11	6	18				RTA	Wplsh/Head	Not ess	Not ess
returned for paramedic					6	3			10	64	60	2 pats conv.		Not ess	Not ess
320	253	28.4.90	P	2	8	4	6	9	3*	32	45	Sport	Back pain	Not ess	Exp
					* called to next case										
321	254	28.4.90	P	/	7	23	7	4	12	53	30	RTA	Sev Hd inj (also chest inj)		Good use
322	255	28.4.90	S	20*	3	30	16	7	11	87	120	Trans	Elec burns	Good use	KAS "Urgent"
					* refuelling at time of call										
323	256	29.4.90	P	2	8	14	5	18*		47	90	Sport	# ankle/	Not ess but painful	
					* returned for second pat.										
324	257	29.4.90	P	/	5	7	6	17	4	39	30	Sport	Sprain leg	Not ess	Not ess
325	258	29.4.90	P	2	10	23*				35	/	?	Head inj	Did not convey pat but helped medically	
					* called to next case										
326	259	29.4.90	S	/	10	6	15	13			300	Trans	Head inj	Just at time	Good use
returned for paramedic as Doctor accompanied					20	1			2	67		from Cas Dept			
Attended RTA on way back but N/R															
327	260	29.4.90	P	2	8	0			9	19	/	RTA(M)			No injury
328	261	30.4.90	S	6	3	10	10	24*		53	120	Trans	Inj req graft	Not ess	Not ess
					* called to next case										
329	262	30.4.90	S	1	10	38	8	15	15	87	150	Trans	Facial graft	Not ess	Not ess
330	263	30.4.90	P	1	10	6	8	27							
returned equipment					10*					62	90	Fall	Spinal	Good use	Justified
					* called to next case										
331	264	30.4.90	P	/	12	11	14	8	5	50	30	Ill.	Heart attk	Good use	Justified
Totals				38	138	187	101	160	81	705	1065				
												Flying 320			

Note

Helicopter was unavailable on 26 and 27 April.

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 8															
332		3.5.90	T						5	5	/	LOX			
333	265	3.5.90	S	0	14	27	23	11	17	92	?	Trans	HI	Good use	
334		3.5.90	T						45	45	/				
				en route checked on RTA in Sheppey: pat conv LA											
335	266	3.5.90	P	1					6	7	/	RTA			Canc en route
336	267	3.5.90	P	2	10	5			8	25	/	RTA	Minor inj		NR
337	268	3.5.90	P	2	12	10			5*	29	/	RTA	#wrist		Pat conv LA
				* called on to next											
338	269	3.5.90	S	/	6	25	22	33	10	96	90	Trans	Unst angina	Not ess	Not ess
339		4.5.90	T						15	15	/	PR			Press photos
340	270	4.5.90	S	2	10	16	13	26	—*	67	120	Trans	Post op	Not ess	Not ess
				* called on to next											
341	271	4.5.90	S	1	33	23	23	11	15	106	?	Trans	Card fail	Approp/convenient but not ess	
342	269	4.5.90	S	2	11	27	13	15	12	80	75	Trans	Cranl haem	Not ess	Not ess
343		5.5.90	T						5?	5?	/	LOX			
344	270	5.5.90	P	0	3	60	8	10	—*	81	20	RTA	Mult inj	Just at time but not ess on f/up	
				* called on to next											
345	271	5.5.90	P	2	9	4			—*	15	/	RTA	Minor inj		Pat conv LA
				* went on to Northfleet Amb station open day											
346		5.5.90	T						5	5	/				Relocation
347	272	5.5.90	P	2	7	2			?	11+	/	RTA(M)			No injury
348	273	5.5.90	P	2	17	14	9	18	5*	65	20	Fall (off bike) HI		Insuff data	Insuff data
				* called on to next											
349	274	5.5.90	P	0	6	1			10	17	/	RTA			NR
350	275	5.5.90	S	1	14	35	24	9	12	95	?	Trans	Ht transplt	Convenient but not life-saving (No donor waiting)	
351	275	6.5.90	P	4	12	2			13	31	/	RTA			NR
352		6.5.90	T						13	13	/	PR			Pens Pl Open Day
353	276	6.5.90	P	2	10	3			20	35	/	RTA	No injury		NPC
354	277	6.5.90	P	2	10	15			12	39	/	RTA(M)	Minor inj.		Pat conv LA

Cont./.

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 8 (Cont.)															
355		7.5.90	T						4	4	/	LOX			
356	278	7.5.90	S	1	2	15	17	8	16	59	?	Trans	N/S	None	
357	279	7.5.90	P	1	5	35			?	41+	/	RTA	# femur		Pat conv LA
358	280	7.5.90	P	2	9				3*	14	/	RTA			Waved away
				* called on to next											
359	281	7.5.90	P	0					9	9	/	RTA			Canc en route
360	282	7.5.90	P	2	10	8			3	23	/	Fall	Cut head	Justified send	Pat conv LA
361	283	7.5.90	P	2	5	20			5	32	/	RTA	Shock		Pat conv LA
362	284	7.5.90	P	2	10	23			10	45	/	RTA	DOA	Justified send	Body conv LA
363	285	7.5.90	P	2	14	24	9	7	18	74	20	Inj	Rectal haem	Not ess but kind	(elderly pat)
364	286	8.5.90	P	1	5	87			3*	96	/	RTA(M)	Multiple – cut out/treated		Pat conv HEMS/LA
				* called on to next											
365	287	8.5.90	S	–	5	40	10	20	11*	86	45	Trans	CT Scan	Not ess	Not ess
				* called on to next											
366	288	8.5.90	P	–	7	6			9	22	/	RTA	No injury		NPC
367	289	8.5.90	P	1	2	18			5	26	/	RTA	Slight		Pat conv LA
368		8.5.90	T						?	?		PR			Telethon
369	290	8.5.90	P	1	6	17			6	30	/	RTA(M)	Slight		Pat conv LA
Totals				40	264	562	171	168	335	1540					

Note: Helicopter worked an extra day (Tuesday)

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 9															
370		10.5.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
371	291	10.5.90	S	5	15	45	25	5	10	105	180	Trans	Card haem	Good use	
372	292	12.5.90	P	2	6	7			—*	15	/	RTA	No injury		No pat conv
				* carried on to next											
373		12.5.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
374	293	13.5.90	P	1	4				6	11	/	Fall	Hand inj	Waved away	Pat conv LA
375	294	13.5.90	P	1	3	15	2	31	6	58	30	Sport	#Rib, contsn	Not ess	Not ess
376	295	13.5.90	P	1	9	13			7	30	/	RTA	No injury		NPC
377	296	13.5.90	P	2	9	20	8	27	2	68	90	III(S)	Back pain	Not ess but exp	Remote site
378		14.5.90	T									LOX			
379	297	14.5.90	P	2	5	15	5	20	—*	47	60	Fall(M)	Back/Abdo	Just at time	Difficult site
				* called on to next											
380	298	14.5.90	S	7	5	33	16	9	18	88	180	Trans	Spinal inj	Not ess but convenient	
381	299	14.5.90	S	7	4	25	15	11	14	76	150	Trans	N/S	Insuff data	Insuff data
382	300	14.5.90	P	3	9	9			6*	27	/	III(M)		Just send	Nothing found
383	301	14.5.90	P	—	15	39	8	16	3	81	90	III(S)	Chest pain	Not ess	Pax on Olau ship
Totals				31	84	221	79	119	92	626	780				
										Flying 255					

Note: Helicopter did not work on Friday

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 10															
		[gap in numbering]													
384	307	18.5.90	S	/	7	17	14	9	12	59	75	Trans	Brn tumour	Not ess	Not essential
385	308	18.5.90	P	2	3	6			4	15	/	RTA	Fainted		NR
386	309	18.5.90	P	2	4	7	3	24	5	45	?	RTA	Neck/head	Not ess	Expedient loc'n
387	310	18.5.90	S	/	15	17	24	6	15	77	210	Trans	Heart condn		KAS "Urgent"
388	311	18.5.90	S	15	13	22	28	22	14	114	210	Trans	Spinal T12		KAS "Urgent"
389	312	18.5.90	P	1	7	10			7	25	/	RTA(M)	Shocked	Just. by loc'n	Pat ref treatt.
390	313	19.5.90	S	13	14	25	20	10	12	94	180	Trans	R pneumo thorax		
391	314	19.5.90	S	2	20	17	28	9	16	92	?	Trans	Blocked shunt		Not essential
392		19.5.90	T						10	10	/	Fund.			
393	315	19.5.90	P	1	7	13	7	26	4	58	90	Ind(M)	Back	Not ess	Exp location(M)
394	316	19.5.90	P	1	2	19	2	35	4	63	30	RTA	Sus breath	Highly approp.	Good use/
												(+ mult fractures)		for ease/comfort	treatment
383	317	19.5.90	S	4	14	19	6	18	2*	63	90	Trans	GI bleed		KAS "Urgent"
				* then called on to next											
396	318	19.5.90	P	/	4	7	4	11	4	30	45	RTA	Back	Not ess	
397	319	20.5.90	P	2	8	24			8	42	/	RTA	Bruising	Approp call	Pat conveyed LA
398	320	20.5.90	P	1	1	4*			2	8	/	RTA(M)			Just. by loc'n
				*overhead but did not land											
399		20.5.90	T						4	4	/	LOX			
400	321	20.5.90	P	1	15	14	5	21	19	75	120	Sports	# ankle	Very exp	Exp loc'n
401	322	20.5.90	P	2	5	3*				10	/	?	Cut knee	Not ess	
				* then called on to next											
402	323	20.5.90	P	1	5	5	11	20	8	50	90	RTA(m/c)	# arm/back pain		Not ess
403	324	20.5.90	P	1					18	19	/	RTA			Nothing found
404	325	20.5.90	P	1	12				2*	15	/	RTA			NR
				* then called to next											
405	326	20.5.90	P	/	5	16	5	21	1*	48	90	III	Chest pain	Exp location	
				* then called to next											
406	327	20.5.90	P	/	7	15	8	5	*	35	180	RTA(M)	Abdo/chest	Insuff data	Justified (M)
				* returned for second patient											
407	328	20.5.90	P	/	6	5	7	22	13	53		RTA(M)	Back inj	Insuff data	Justified (M)
408	329	20.5.90	S	7	3	11	14	48							
				(wait and return)											
409	330	21.5.90	S	9	13	24	38	21	38	125	240	Trans	Hd inj (RTA)		KAS "Urgent"
										143	300	Trans	# back C5		KAS "Urgent"
Totals				66	190	300	231	348	237	1372					

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 11															
411	332	26.5.90	P	1	5*					6		RTA			Stood down
				* then called to next (recorded out of sequence)											
410	331	26.5.90	P	/	7	13	3	14	13	50	20	RTA	# leg	Not ess	Not ess
412	333	26.5.90	P	1	6	4			9*	23	/	RTA(M)			NR
					3*							RTA(M)			
				* stopped to investigate second RTA(M): no inj.											
413	334	26.5.90	P	2	11	6	8	7	2	36	25	RTA IS	# foot	Not ess	Exp location
414		27.5.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			Stood down
415	335	27.5.90	P	2					21	23	/	RTA			Pat conv LA
416	336	27.5.90	P	1	6	4			8	19	/	RTA			Pat conv LA
417	337	27.5.90	P	2	9	10			8	29	/	?	Hip inj. (farm)		Exp location
418	338	27.5.90	P	2	9	7	6	3	3	30	20	Fall IS	Head inj	Insuff data	
												(from bike)			
419	339	27.5.90	P	2	10	1			11	24	/	RTA			NPC
420	340	27.5.90	P	2	5				7	14	/	Fire			Stood down
421	341	27.5.90	P	3	14	11	5	35*		68	20	RTA	#face/leg	Exp/emotional (child of 4)	Good use and exp loc'n
				* then called to next											
422	342	27.5.90	P	/	11	11*				22	/	?			NPC
				* then called to next											
423	343	27.5.90	P	/	14	10	17	17	3	61	20	?	#nose/neck inj.	Not ess	Not justified
424	344	28.5.90	P	2	3	22			3	30	/	RTA(M)	Head inj	Appropriate	Unable conv by heli due to behaviour
															Exp loc'n
425	345	28.5.90	P	2	10	20	2	23	20	77	30	RTA(M)	Back inj	Not ess	Exp loc'n
426	346	28.5.90	P	1	15	17	4	17	3*	57	90	Suic	Hypothermia	Not ess	Exp loc'n
				* then called to next											
427	347	28.5.90	P	/	2	15	3	19	2	41	60	Fall	Collapse	Not ess	Not justified
428	348	28.5.90	P	1	9	21	3	27	18*	79	30	RTA	Mult/int inj	LIFE SAVED in view of consultt	
				* then called to next											
429	349	28.5.90	P	/	4	10	6	17	31*	68	60	Air crash	Head inj	Not ess	Exp loc'n
				* then called to next											
430	350	28.5.90	P	/	3	5			10	18	/	RTA			NPC
431	351	28.5.90	P	1					24	25	/	RTA			NR
Totals				25	153	190	57	179	206	810					

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 12															
432		30.5.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
433		30.5.90	T						6*	6	/	PR			
				* then called to next											
434	352	30.5.90	S	/	3	19	12	8	12	54	120	Trans	Hand inj		KAS "Urgent"
435	353	30.5.90	S	/	11	14	21	3	10	59	180	Trans	Pneumothorax		KAS "Urgent"
436	354	31.5.90	P	1	5	12	6	44	3	71	90	RTA IS	Hd inj/lac	Not ess	Exp loc'n
437	355	31.5.90	P	2	13	18			11	44	/	III	Abdo pain		Pat conv LA
438	356	31.5.90	S	1	2	9	12	14	12	50	120	Trans	Unstable angina		KAS "Urgent"
				* then called to next											
439	357	31.5.90	S	/	1	19	12	12	7	51	120	Trans	Amputated finger		KAS "Urgent"
440	358	1.6.90	S	1	23	16	24	15							
							55*			134	240	Trans	Spinal ex RTA		KAS "Urgent"
				* then called to next											
441	359	1.6.90	S	/	14	5	17	10	10	56	180	Trans	Sub dorsal haem		KAS "Urgent"
442	360	1.6.90	S	1	24	12	10	8	18	73	60	Trans	Burns		KAS "Urgent"
443	361	1.6.90	S	1	2	15	13	15*		46	120	Trans	Sub arach haem		KAS "Urgent"
				* then called to next											
444	362	1.6.90	S	/	24	18	32	8	11	93	180	Trans	Brn Tmr		KAS "Urgent"
445	363	2.6.90	P	1	1	38			7	47	/	?	Hd inj (treated heli crew)		Pat conv LA
446	364	2.6.90	P	1	7	18	6	21	6	59	90	RTA	Lac/shock	Not ess	Not ess
447		2.6.90	T						30	30	/	PR			
448	365	2.6.90	P	3	4	8			10	25	/	RTA	Abrasions		Pat conv LA
449	366	2.6.90	P	1	4	20	3	18	12	58	45	III	CVA?	Not ess	Exp loc'n
450	367	3.6.90	P	2	3	15	4	18	/	42	60	III	Respiratory	Not ess	Exp loc'n
451		3.6.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
452	368	3.6.90	P	1	4				4*	9	/	N/S			Stood down
				* then called to next											
453	369	3.6.90	P	/	3	23			13	39	/	RTA	Hd inj		Pat conv LA
														(pregnant and scared of flying)	

Cont./.

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 12 (cont.)															
454	370	3.6.90	P	1	4	5	9	4	10	33	90	SprtIS	Discloc knee	Not ess	Exp loc'n
455	371	3.6.90	P	1	9					10	/	Fallen trees			Stood down
456		3.6.90	T						25	25	/	LOX			
457	372	3.6.90	P	1	14	20	4	30	3	72	30	RTA(M)	Back/neck	Not ess	Exp loc'n
458	373	3.6.90	P	1	4	10			4	19	/	RTA(M)			Pat conv LA
459	374	3.6.90	S	1	12	33	25								
						16	16	17	12*	132	180	Trans	Dis Aortic Aneur		KAS "Urgent"
				* then called to next											
460	375	3.6.90	P	/	6	5			3	14		RTA			Pat ref treatt
461	376	4.6.90	P	3	8	8	7	17	3	46	90	RTA	Whiplash	Not ess	Poss exp loc'n
462	377	4.6.90	P	2	4	10*				16	/	Ill	Cardiac		Pat conv LA
				* then called to next											
463	378	4.6.90	P	/	10	15	5	38	3	71	60	ConsM	# Ankle	Not ess but kind	Exp loc'n
464	379	4.6.90	P	1	9	30	4	27	9	80	90	Fall	# Legs	Follow up had no	response
465	380	4.6.90	S	3	6	21	16	64	22	132	150	Trans	Pacemaker		KAS "Urgent"
Totals				30	234	452	313	391	296	1716					

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 13															
466	381	7.6.90	P	1					3	4	/	RTA			Stood down
467	382	7.6.90	P	1	4	16	6	35		62	/	RTA	Back inj	Not lifethreat	Not ess
468		7.6.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
469	383	7.6.90	P	1	9	7	6	4	10	37	45	Horse	Bruises	Not ess	(kick)
470	384	7.6.90	P	1	11	5	5	19	11*	52	60	RTA	#Ank/shock	Not ess	Exp loc'n
				* then called to next											
471	385	7.6.90	P	/	5				6	11	/	Ill	Diab coll		Stood down
472	386	7.6.90	S	1	8	15	8	13	4	49	75	Trans	# Femur		KAS "Urgent"
473	387	8.6.90	S	1	12	21	23	22	7*	86	180	Trans	Brn tmr		KAS "Urgent"
				* then spotted next from air											
474	388	8.6.90	P	/	2	14	5	31	3*	55	45	RTA	Back/neck	Not ess	Exp as passing
				* then called to next											
475	389	8.6.90	P	/	2	10	1	19	4	36	15	Ill	Collapse	Not ess	Exp loc'n
476	390	8.6.90	P	1	4*					5	/	RTA			Diverted
				* then called to next											
477	391	8.6.90	P	/	2	10	4	12*		28	25	RTA	Head inj	Not ess	
				* then called to next											
478	392	8.6.90	P	5	5	5			4	19	/	RTA	Non inj		NPC
479	393	9.6.90	S	5	20	17	30	8	15	95	420	Trans	Angioplast		KAS "Urgent"
480	394	9.6.90	S	5	13	22	20	10*		70	300	Trans	Depressed skull		KAS "Urgent"
				* then called to next											
481	395	9.6.90	S	/	4	36	13	7	10	70	90	Trans	Pacemaker		KAS "Urgent"
482	396	9.6.90	P	2	9	16	6	17*		50	60	Sports	Hit by pellets, fitted		Not ess
				* then called to next											
483	397	9.6.90	S	/	7	10	13	8	10	48	150	Trans	Sub arach haem		KAS "Urgent"
484	398	10.6.90	S	/	10	13	16	6	15	60	135	Trans	Fac inj		KAS "Urgent"
485		10.6.90	T						10	10	/	LOX			
486		10.6.90	T						30*	30	/	PR			
				* then called to next											
487	399	10.6.90	P	/	7				5	12	/	N/S IS	Wrist inj		NR
488	400	10.6.90	P	3	6	36	5	28	15	93	7	RTA	Mult inj/#	Patient died 48 hours later	
489	401	11.6.90	S	/	2	18	13	5	15	53	195	Trans	Unstable mandible		
490	402	11.6.90	S	5	2	22	14	12	13	68	195	Trans	Burns		
491	403	11.6.90	P	2	3	5			4	14	/	Ill	Cardiac		DOA
Totals				34	147	298	188	256	204	1127					

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 14															
491	(sic)	13.6.90	T						3	3	/	LOX			
492	405	13.6.90	S	/	3	22			4	29	/	Trans	Skin graft	Pat too heavy: not conveyed	
493	406	13.6.90	P	2	6	16	3	20	2	49	N/S	RTA	#Arm/ank	Not ess	Exp loc'n
494	407	13.6.90	P	1	8	12			11	32	/	N/S	Discloc hip		Pat conv LA
495	408	13.6.90	P	2	6	11*			/	19		RTA			Pat conv LA
* then called to next															
496	409	13.6.90	P	/	3	6	(did not land)		8	17	/	RTA			NR
497	410	13.6.90	P	1	9	10			11	31	/	III	Collapse		DOA
498	411	14.6.90	P	2	3	11	5	18	3	42	N/S	III(M)	CVA	Not ess	Exp loc'n
499	412	14.6.90	P	2	9	17			6	34	/	III IS	Angina		Pat conv LA
500	413	14.6.90	S	4	7	33	13	15	11	83	N/S	Trans	Fac inj		
501	414	15.6.90	P	2	6	3			5*	16	/	RTA			Pat conv LA
* then called to next															
502	415	15.6.90	P	/	7	9	4	N/S	/	20	N/S	RTA(M)	Chest pain	Cld be life-thrt	Very approp in view consultt
503		15.6.90	T						6	6	/	LOX			
504	416	15.6.90	P	/	2	20			/	22	/	III	Pregnant, dizzy. etc.		Pat conv LA
505		15.6.90	T						N/S	N/S	/	PR			
506	417	15.6.90	S	/	2	20	12	21	5	60	N/S	Trans	Angina		
507	418	15.6.90	S	12	5	18	11	5							
						26	12		5	94	90	Trans	Thoracic haem		
508	419	15.6.90	S	2	3	26	18	10	16	75	N/S	Trans	H/L Transplant		
509	420	16.6.90	P	1	10	11			8	30	/	III IS	Angina		Pat conv LA
510	421	16.6.90	P	2	7				11	20	/	RTA			Waved away
511	422	16.6.90	P	1	16*					17		RTA			Nothing found
* then called to next															
512	423	16.6.90	P	/	5	8*				13	/	RTA			Pat conv LA
* then called to next															
513	424	16.6.90	P	/	6				8	14	/	N/S			Stood down
514	425	16.6.90	S	2	9*					11		Trans			Diverted on
* then called to next															
515	426	16.6.90	P	/	6	12	4	18*		40	35	III	Ep fit	Not ess	
* then returned to previous															
516	427	16.6.90	S	/	13	8	21	14	11	67	300	Trans	Angina		

Cont./...

Flt	Case	Date	Flt. Type	To T/O	In Flt.	On Grd	To Hosp.	At Hosp.	To Base	Total	cf LA Saving	Type Incid.	Medical Diagnosis	Medical Comment	Other Comment
WEEK 14 (cont.)															
517	428	17.6.90	P	3	7	10	7	18*		45	60	Sport	Back pain (parachutist at aerodrome)	Not ess	Exp loc'n
				* then called to next											
518	429	17.6.90	P	/					7	7	/	RTA			Stood down
519	430	17.6.90	P	2	7	30	6	23	4	72	60	Sport	#Ankle (parachutist at aerodrome)	Not ess	Exp location
520	431	17.6.90	P	2	8	2			4	16	/	Ill	Ep fit		Pat conv LA
			T						12*	12			Divert for new switch for oxygen		
				* then called to next											
48 521	432	17.6.90	P	/	5	14	4	6*		29	35	Fall?	Disloc hip	Not ess but kind (pat 90 yrs)	
				* then called to next											
522	433	17.6.90	P	/	8	14	16	1	3	42	/	Ill	Not breathing		Pat conv LA
														but heli did errand to hosp.	
523	434	17.6.90	P	2	4	7*				13		N/S	#Tibia		Diverted to next
				* then called to next											
524	435	17.6.90	P	/	6	22	6	20	3	57	30	Ill	Chest pain	Very approp in view consultt	
														Pat recovered after period in I/C	
525	436	17.6.90	P	2	10	7	9	21	2	51	90	O/D IS	Overdose	Justified and exp loc'n	
526	437	18.6.90	S	2	8				8*	18	/	Trans	Prem baby IS		DOA
				* then called to next											
527	438	18.6.90	S	2	9	20	24	14	12	81	390	Trans	Fit pacemaker		
528	439	18.6.90	P	2	2				1*	5	/	RTA			Stood down
				* then called to next											
529	440	18.6.90	P	/	4	20	4	25*		53	60	Ill	CVA	Not ess	
				* then called to next on same site											
530	441	18.6.90	S	/	0	20	13	3	9*	45	180	Trans	#Maxilla		
				* then called to next											
531	442	18.6.90	P	/	3*					3		RTA			Diverted
532	443	18.6.90	P	/	17	27	4	27	15	90	90	RTA	Mult #	# spine: use of heli may have prevented perm disability; pat now discharged	
															Not required
533	444	18.6.90	P	2	3	3			3	11	/	RTA			
534	445	18.6.90	P	1	4	13	6	16	3	43	N/S	RTA	Nosebleed	Not ess but kind	
535	446	18.6.90	P	1	6	13	3	20	4	47	75	RTA	Chest inj	Not ess	
Totals				57	262	521	205	315	224	1584					